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1. Introduction
The social and private costs of crime are estimated to account for 3.8 to 4.3% and 7.5 to 9.0%
of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the U.S. and South America, respectively
(Bourguignon, 1999). Because of the enormous social and economic impacts of crime, since
Becker (1968), many economic studies have examined the determinants of crime. However,
the astoundingly high variance of crime rates across time and space continues to pose a
puzzle even today (Glaeser et al., 1996).
While previous studies have argued that peer effects causing multiple equilibria can
explain crime disparity, two issues still remain. First, there is no consensus on whether peer
effects indeed explain crime disparity. While some previous empirical studies have found
evidence to support this claim (Glaeser et al., 1996; Zenou, 2003; Patacchini and Zenou,
2008; Bayer et al., 2009; Patacchini and Zenou, 2012), others have not (Ludwig and Kling,
2007; Dahl and DellaVigna, 2009). This mixed empirical evidence is partly derived from the
difficulties in identifying peer effects using survey data (Manski 1993; 2000), which suggests
the importance of additional studies using experimental approaches, such as those employed
by Falk and Fischbacher (2002) and Keizer et al. (2008).
Another unresolved issue is that while previous studies examined the magnitude of
peer effects, they did not identify how peer effects occur. However, there exist at least three
potential causes for their occurrence. The first cause is strategic complementarity, namely
that the material payoffs of individuals increase when they conform.1 Second, peer effects
occur when the utility loss caused by extrinsic incentives—including disapproval by peers
1 For example, the probability of detection can decrease as the crime incidence committed by peers
increases (Sah, 1991). High crime incidences among peers also raise the marginal return from illegal
activities and decline that from legal activities (Murphy et al., 1993).
and a negative social image—decreases with an increase in crime incidents among peers
(Rasmusen, 1996; Funk, 2005). Third, intrinsic motivations, such as guilt and pride, may also
dissuade people from committing crimes. The motivations may, however, decline as crime
incidence among peers increases (Funk, 2005). By nature, extrinsic incentives arise only
when the individual’s identity and actions are observable to his/her reference group, while
intrinsic motivations do not require that anyone else know how the person acts (Zafar, 2011).
The present study bridges these gaps in the literature by answering two questions. In
the first part of this paper, I assume that individuals exhibit guilt aversion, and I attempt to
identify how crime incidences among peers lead to a decline in an individual’s guilt and
therefore tempt him/her to commit a crime. The second part aims at testing the validity of
guilt aversion. An intriguing aspect of guilt aversion is that it is belief-dependent; guilt
aversion presumes that decision makers experience guilt if they believe they let others down
(Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). Therefore, an allocation of resources can lead to different
welfare levels depending on the beliefs of individuals. This may be a critical aspect in
criminal investigations.
Guilt aversion predicts two potential channels through which crime incidence among
peers influences crime incidence by an individual: changes in guilt sensitivity and belief. The
former indicates that criminals become less sensitive to letting their victims down in a
crime-prone community. The latter means that when crime is common, criminals anticipate
that citizens have higher expectations about the risk of crime victimisation, which in turn
decreases the guilt criminals feel when committing crimes against such people. This is also
consistent with the broken windows theory of criminology (Kelling and Wilson, 1982;
Wilson and Kelling, 2003).2
2 The broken windows theory claims that, if a neighbourhood ignores the incidence of petty crime, such as
broken windows, potential criminals would anticipate that the neighbourhood does not care about crime.
This study isolates these two channels, which is important for two reasons. First,
recent studies have argued whether heterogeneity in behaviour within and across individuals
is caused by heterogeneity in beliefs or preferences (Ellingsen et al., 2012; Fehr and Hoff
2011; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010; Vanberg 2008). This study contributes to the literature.
Second, policy implications would differ for the channels (see Section 7).
The second part of this study develops a unique approach to elicit the guilt sensitivity
parameter at the individual level. Previous studies tested guilt aversion by examining the
correlation between the subjects’ beliefs and choices and found mixed evidence of guilt
aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Reuben et al., 2009; Ellingsen et al., 2010;
Kawagoe and Narita, 2011). On the other hand, this study looks at the correlation between
choices and guilt sensitivity, as well as the correlation between choices and beliefs, and
shows robust supporting evidence. This paper also addresses concerns regarding alternative
hypotheses explaining behavioural patterns, such as pure altruism and trustworthiness.
To achieve these goals, three types of experiments were conducted. First, two sessions
of take-away games were employed to approximate crime in the experimental framework
(Eichenberger and Oberholzer–Gee, 1998; Falk and Fischbacher, 2002; Schildberg–Horisch
and Strassmair, 2010). Second, a trust game with hidden actions was used to elicit guilt
sensitivity and trustworthiness. This game is frequently used in literature pertaining to guilt
aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2010;
Ellingsen, et al., 2010; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2011; Kawagoe and Narita, 2011). Finally,
I also conducted a dictator game to elicit pure altruism.
This study addresses three major issues regarding experimental studies. First, there is
little experimental evidence from developing countries. Second, in many studies, the subjects
are self-selected to participate in the experiment, causing estimation results to be biased. The
This, in turn, leads to more serious crimes.
third issue concerns external validity (Loewenstein, 1999; Guala and Mittone, 2005); the
behaviour in the experiment might not represent that of the real world. To address these
issues, the experiment was conducted in rural Bangladesh. Of the 285 randomly selected
households, 279 participated in the experiment. This study, furthermore, used survey data
collected from the participant households to examine the external validity.
Experiments and surveys about crime in developing countries, such as Bangladesh,
are particularly significant since developing countries have long grappled with problems
arising from ineffective law enforcement. Therefore, intrinsic motivation and extrinsic
incentive are expected to play significant roles in controlling crime in such areas. Note,
however, that the experimental design is applicable to other countries as well. I found that
The results show that the behavioural patterns in the experiment are consistent with
guilt aversion, whereas participants’ altruism and trustworthiness are not consistent;
participants with higher guilt sensitivity and/or with lower second-order belief are less likely
to commit crime. In addition, peer effects occur through changes in second-order belief.
Finally, I show the external validity of elicited guilt sensitivity; individuals are less likely to
suffer from property crime in villages where a neighbourhood has higher guilt sensitivity.
The next section describes the design and treatment of a take-away game. Section 3
summarises the theoretical framework of guilt aversion. Section 4 formalises the testable
hypotheses and presents the results. In Section 5, the methodology to elicit guilt sensitivity
and test guilt aversion is introduced. Section 6 shows the external validity of guilt sensitivity.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. Survey and Experimental Design
2.1. Sampling of Subjects
In December 2010, a total of 288 households were randomly sampled in 16 rural villages (18
households per village) in Satkhira district, Bangladesh, of which 285 participated in my
household survey. 3 After finishing the survey, the survey enumerators requested the
households to participate in the experiment, which would be conducted eight months later,
and told that the participants would be given payment as a reward for their cooperation in the
survey.
In August 2011, 279 out of the 285 surveyed households participated in the
experiment.4 A total of 36 subjects from 2 villages were invited per day. The experiments
were conducted over 8 days. I randomly chose half the subjects (9 from each village) and
allocated them to room C. The remaining subjects were allocated to room T. The subjects in
room C were divided into subjects for even- and odd-numbered experiment days. Thus, the
subjects were randomly divided into three groups: the treatment group (137 subjects) in room
T, the control group (71 subjects) in room C, and the remaining (71 subjects) in room C. I
used the data from the third group in Section 6 only, because they participated in different
games.
Each subject participated in various games, such as the take-away game, dictator
game, trust game with hidden action, risk preference game, and trust game with complete
information. Each subject received his/her payoff from only one randomly selected decision
after finishing all the games. Therefore, they did not know from which decision they received
the payoff and were aware that each subject had earned money from a different decision. This
is important for two reasons. First, it alleviates the correlation of choices within subjects
across games due to the wealth effect. Second, if subjects were to earn money from all games
and discuss the payoffs after the experiment, they might have been able to infer the choices of
3 Table A1 presents the summary statistics of the survey data. The details about the sampling process are
described in Appendix A.
4 In order to assure the sample size, I did not randomly select the experiment participants
within households.
the other subjects. This would have violated subject anonymity, potentially affecting
behaviour. A fuller description about the experiment procedure is available from the author
upon request.
2.2. Take-away Game
One of the challenges in this study is the replication of criminal activities in an experimental
setting. Previous studies employed a take-away game (gangster game) to investigate
experimentally crime and anti-social behaviour (Eichenberger and Oberholzer–Gee, 1998;
Falk and Fischbacher, 2002; Schildberg–Hörisch and Strassmair, 2010). I do the same.
This game is played anonymously by a randomly matched pair of subjects: Player A
and Player B. In the beginning of the game, experimenters give 400 Taka (Tk) to Player A
and nothing to Player B. This amount is equivalent to about four days’ worth of income in the
study area. While Player B receives nothing initially, he/she can take away 0 Tk, 50 Tk, 100
Tk, 150 Tk, 200 Tk, 250 Tk, 300 Tk, 350 Tk, or 400 Tk, as much as he/she wishes, from
Player A. Player A cannot protect the endowment from Player B. The material payoff of
Player A is, therefore, 400 – x and that of Player B is x, where x is the amount Player B
decides to take away.
x is considered to be the approximation of crime or anti-social behaviour. Yet, subjects
might not equate this experiment to real crime if, for example, the subjects think of the
endowment as an unexpected gift from the experimenters to Player A, or if the amount is too
small for them to play the game seriously. I address these issues by adjusting the endowment
amount to about four times their daily income, thus increasing the incentive to play the game
seriously. Further, Player B knows that the household of Player A participated in the survey.
This strengthens the idea that Player A deserves to keep some of the payoff. In other words,
Player A received the money as a reward for participating in the survey. Yet, Player B might
still not consider it anti-social to take the money away from Player A, since he/she also
contributed to the same survey. As a consequence, subjects may consider equal allocation,
called the 50-50 norm, as suitable (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). Thus, I use two measures
to approximate crime: the level of x (like previous studies) and a binary variable, which takes
unity if the subject violates the 50-50 norm (x > 200).
2.2.1. Session 1
I conducted two sessions of the take-away game. The first session applied the strategy
method regarding the subjects’ roles, so that all subjects made decisions as both Player A and
B.5 They were asked the following questions:6
[T1-1] Suppose you are Player B. How much money will you take away from Player A?
[T1-2] Suppose you are Player A. How much money do you think Player B will take away
from you?
The latter question represents Player A’s belief about the choice of Player B who is paired
with him/her. Table A2 presents the summary statistics of the experimental results.
2.2.2. Session 2 with the treatment
The pairs were randomly matched in the second session also. Each subject was asked about
the choice as Player B only, and the experimental design was changed slightly. For the control
group, the experimenters informed each subject about how much the subjects in the previous
5 Although the strategy method has some potential concerns, Brandts and Charness (2011) claimed (based
on a large number of previous studies) that the results of the strategy and direct-response methods are
comparable.
6 The experimenters actually asked the other questions as well, but this study does not use the associated
answers.
days took away from their paired Player A (peer information) as follows:
[T2-1] You are chosen as Player B. Some participants in the previous days took away about
_______ Tk, and Player A paired with you also knows this. Then, how much money will
you take away?
Regarding the peer information, since most subjects chose to take away 100 Tk, 200 Tk, or
300 Tk, one value was randomly chosen for each subject.7 Player B decided how much
money to take away conditional on this information. The peer effects in this study are defined
by the correlation between the peer information and x.
On the other hand, for the treatment group, the experimenters informed each subject
about (the paired) Player A’s belief about x and the peer information as follows:
[T2-2] You are chosen as Player B. Some participants in the previous days took away about
_______ Tk, and Player A paired with you also knows this. Also, Player A anticipates
that you will take away ______ Tk. Then, how much money will you take away?
Regarding the information about Player A’s belief, I used the result of the paired subject from
[T1-2]. I will discuss in Section 4 how this experimental design identifies the channels of
peer effects after showing the theoretical framework in the next section.
3. Impact of Peer Information on Guilt Averse Individuals
Guilt aversion predicts that an individual experiences a utility loss if he/she believes his/her
behaviour falls short of someone’s expectation and lets the latter down. This concept was
theoretically formalised by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) and extended to experimental
studies by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Miettinen and Suetens (2008), Vanberg (2008),
Reuben et al. (2009), Ellingsen et al. (2010), Dufwenberg et al. (2011), Kawagoe and Narita
(2011), and Ellingsen et al. (2012).
7 Therefore, each individual within the experiment room received different information.
In the context of the take-away game, Player B feels guilt if he/she believes that
he/she takes away more than Player A expects. Suppose τA represents Player A’s expectation
about x. Then, the excess amount Player B takes away is indicated by max{x – τA, 0}. Since
τ
A is unobservable for Player B, he/she does not know exactly by how much his/her choice
lets Player A down. Hence, he/she makes decisions based on his/her expectation about τA,
which is denoted by τB. In other words, τA and τB are the first- and second-order belief about x,
respectively. Therefore, max{x – τB, 0} indicates how much Player B believes he/she lets
Player A down by taking away as much as x. The utility function of Player B with the guilt
averse preference can be described as follows:
uB= x – g max{x – τB, 0}, (1)
where g represents the guilt sensitivity parameter. In this formula, the optimal level of x is
400 if g is less than 1 and τB otherwise. This leads to the following predictions: (1) Subjects
with g 1 are less likely to take away more than τB and (2) x increases with an increase in τB
and a decrease in g.
In this utility function, there would be two potential channels through which peer
information affects x. First, guilt sensitivity declines by knowing that the peers take away a
lot ( , where is the amount the peers take away) (Funk, 2005; Sliwka,
2007).8 In other words, Player B does not experience the guilt disutility from taking away
more than Player A’s expectation even though he/she believes his/her choice lets Player A
down. Second, the second-order belief increases with the level of peer information
8 Related studies include Lindbeck (1997) and Lindbeck et al. (1999), who considered that the moral costs
of being against norms decreases with the share of norm violators among the population. Sliwka (2007)
assumed that individuals switch their preference, whether selfish or fair, depending on the proportions of
the preferences among the population. Funk (2005) also developed a model to incorporate the change in
preference based on the distribution of preferences among the population.
( ). Given that the peers take away a lot, Player A’s belief about x would
increase. Expecting this, Player B would also form a high second-order belief. Therefore,
he/she believes that taking away a large amount should not let Player A down in such a
situation. This, in turn, increases the amount to take away.
4. Testing the Existence of Peer Effects and the Channels
4.1. Testable Hypothesis
This section describes the strategy to disentangle the channels of peer effects. My
experimental design allows peer effects to occur only through changes in intrinsic motivation;
each subject is anonymously paired with a randomly selected opponent to rule out extrinsic
incentives.9 In addition, peer information does not affect the material payoff of any subject,
ruling out strategic complementarity. This strategy is similar to Zafar (2011), who
investigated how conformity in pro-social behaviour occurs among individuals.
Furthermore, the comparison between the control and treatment groups isolates the
impact of change in the second-order belief from total peer effects. Since the experimenters in
the control group provided the subjects with peer information only, the correlation between x
and peer information captures the total impact of peer information. On the other hand, in the
treatment group, the experimenters informed the subjects about Player A’s first-order belief
and also provided them with peer information. By letting Player B know about Player A’s
belief, the second- and first-order beliefs coincide. This makes the second-order belief a
random variable observable to researchers. 10 Since Player B’s second-order belief is
9 One might be concerned that the design is not perfectly anonymous, given the fact that the researchers
and experimenters can observe the choices of the subjects. However, this effect may be ignored, according
to Barmettler et al. (2012).
10 The strategy to inform the first-order belief was first suggested by Ellingsen et al. (2010). This
randomly determined regardless of peer information, if a correlation is found in the treatment
group, it should be attributed to a different channel, i.e. one different from the change in the
second-order belief. Thus, the following testable hypothesis is established:
TESTABLE HYPOTHESIS 1: (a) If peer effects do not occur through any channels related
with intrinsic motivation, x should not be correlated with peer information in either group.
(b) If peer effects occur mainly through changes in the second-order belief, then x should be
positively correlated with peer information only in the control group; once the second-order
belief is controlled for, peer effects should disappear.
(c) However, if peer effects occur mainly through other channels, such as change in guilt
sensitivity, then x should be positively correlated with peer information in both groups with
the same magnitude.
(d) If peer effects occur through both channels, then a positive correlation should be found in
both groups, and the magnitude of correlation should be larger in the control group.
In order to test the hypothesis, the following equation is estimated:
, (2)
where ( ) denotes peer information reported to the subjects in the control (treatment)
group. It takes zero for the subjects in the treatment (control) group. takes unity if
individual i belongs to the treatment group and zero otherwise. In this specification,
supports part (a) of the testable hypothesis, and is consistent
with (b), supports (c), and finally implies (d).
procedure reduces the scope for (false) consensus effects.
4.2. Results
Figure 1 depicts the correlation between peer information and the amount Player B took away
on average. One can find a positive correlation in the control group but not in the treatment
group. Table 1 presents the regression results of Equation 2. I employ two econometric
models. First, I use x as the dependent variable and estimate the ordered probit model, given
that it takes only nine values from 0 to 400 Tk. The second model is the probit model with the
dependent variable taking unity if x exceeds 200 Tk. This represents the violation of the
50-50 norm. In order to control for individual and village heterogeneity, I also include village
fixed effects in Columns 2 and 5 and the choice made in the first session in Columns 3 and 6.
Since the subject’s choice may be correlated within the same experiment room each day, I use
cluster-adjusted standard errors.
Table 1 shows that the coefficients of peer information in the control group are
statistically significant, while those of the treatment group show smaller magnitude and are
statistically insignificant. These findings are consistent with peer effects through the change
in the second-order belief about x. They are also consistent with the broken windows theory.
However, there is the possibility of an alternative interpretation. Intrinsic motivations
may include other preferences, such as pure altruism, envy, and trustworthiness. Social
comparison and the anchoring effect can also cause conformity in this setting (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974; Cason and Mui, 1998; Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Frey and Meier,
2004). Therefore, and in Equation 2 may capture these mixed effects. Yet, these
alternatives cannot explain the difference in peer effects between the groups.
In order to address these issues more systematically, Section 5 tests guilt aversion
relative to the other types of preferences. Furthermore, two types of robustness checks are
discussed in Appendix B: the credibility of informed belief and the potential concern that
informed belief and peer information may affect behaviour through different channels.
5. Testing Guilt Aversion
5.1. Methodology to Elicit Guilt Sensitivity
This section tests the following hypotheses, which are derived from Equation 1.
TESTABLE HYPOTHESIS 2: A subject with higher guilt sensitivity is less likely
to take away in excess of his/her second-order belief.
TESTABLE HYPOTHESIS 3: On average, the amount to take away increases with an
increase in the subject’s second-order belief and a decrease in his/her guilt sensitivity.
Eliciting the guilt sensitivity of individuals poses a challenge in testing these
hypotheses. In order to elicit the preference parameter, I conduct a trust game with a hidden
action. This game is commonly used in the literature of guilt aversion (Charness and
Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2010; Ellingsen et al., 2010;
Charness and Dufwenberg, 2011; Kawagoe and Narita, 2011). Therefore, while the elicited
guilt sensitivity would be sensitive to experimental design, I still consider this game to be the
most suitable.
The structure of the game is summarised in Figure 2. Each subject is paired with a
randomly chosen opponent in the other experiment room. They are assigned as Player A and
Player B. The pairs in this game are not necessarily the same as those in the take-away game.
This game has three stages. In the first stage, Player A chooses In or Out. If he/she chooses
Out, the game is over, and both subjects receive 100 Tk each. If In is chosen, the game
proceeds to the second stage, where Player B either chooses Roll the die or Don’t roll. If
Player B does not roll the die, he/she earns 280 Tk, while the paired Player A receives 0 Tk. If
Player B decides to roll the die, it goes to the third stage, where Player B’s payoff is 200 Tk
regardless of the face of the die. However, Player A’s payoff depends on the face of the die.
Player A receives nothing if the face shows 1 and 240 Tk otherwise. A selfish Player B is
expected to choose Don’t roll, and therefore, selfish Player A, who expects this choice,
chooses Out. A trustworthy Player B, on the other hand, chooses Roll the die and Player A,
trusting him, chooses In.
Player B, who is guilt averse, experiences disutility if he does not roll the die when
Player A expects him to. The level of disutility depends on to what extent he anticipates that
Player A trusts him. ρA represents Player A’s belief about Roll the die, conditional on Player A
choosing In. ρB is Player B’s belief about ρA. Since the expected material payoff for Player A
is 200 Tk when Player B rolls the die, Player B believes Player A expects 200ρB Tk when
choosing In. However, if Player B chooses Don’t roll, Player A yields nothing. Thus, Player B
believes that if he does not roll the die, his/her choice will let Player A down by 200ρB Tk.
This causes Player B to achieve a utility as much as 280 – 200ρBg by choosing Don’t roll. If it
exceeds the utility obtained from rolling the die (200 Tk), Player B will behave in a selfish
manner. This implies that Player B rolls the die if and only if ρBg > 0.4. Therefore, subjects
with a certain level of guilt sensitivity should switch their choice from Don’t roll to Roll the
die as ρB increases. The switching point varies depending on their guilt sensitivity.
I use this property. The experimenters explain to the participants that there are seven
potential Player As with different levels of ρA.11 The subjects are asked their decision about
rolling the die for each potential opponent as follows:
[H-4] Player A expects that none of the 18 participants in this room will roll the die. Then,
which option will you choose?
11 In order to help uneducated subjects understand the experiment setting, I use the proportion of
individuals who are anticipated to choose trustworthy behaviour rather than the probability of behaving in
a trustworthy manner.
[H-5] Player A expects that 3 of the 18 participants in this room will roll the die. Then, which
option will you choose?
[H-6] Player A expects that 6 of the 18 participants in this room will roll the die. Then, which
option will you choose?
[H-7] Player A expects that 9 of the 18 participants in this room will roll the die. Then, which
option will you choose?
[H-8] Player A expects that 12 of the 18 participants in this room will roll the die. Then,
which option will you choose?
[H-9] Player A expects that 15 of the 18 participants in this room will roll the die. Then,
which option will you choose?
[H-10] Player A expects that everybody will roll the die. Then, which option will you choose?
Then, I compute the guilt sensitivity of each individual from the switching point, as
summarised in Table 2. This study applies the strategy method. All subjects make decisions as
both players, in order to help me elicit the guilt sensitivity of all subjects. Among the 208
subjects, only one switched to the opposite choice.
The last column in Table 2 presents the distribution of guilt sensitivity among the
subjects. It is significant to note that 25.5% of subjects behaved in a trustworthy manner even
when Player A’s belief was zero. This cannot be explained simply by guilt aversion, because
the net gain from choosing Don’t roll is positive regardless of guilt sensitivity. Rather, this is
consistent with trustworthiness and pure altruism, implying that the indicator of guilt
sensitivity partially captures these social preferences. The econometric analysis in Section 5.3
addresses this concern.
5.2. Results: Testable Hypothesis 2
Figure 3 depicts the correlation among the informed first-order belief, guilt sensitivity, and
the amount to take away. Since this analysis requires data pertaining to informed first-order
belief, I use the sample of the treatment group only. Among the 137 subjects, 28% took away
more than their beliefs, 25% took away the same amount, and 47% took away less. The
straight line in the figure indicates the 45° line. The subjects in the region above this line are
expected to experience disutility. As summarised in the Testable Hypothesis 2, guilt aversion
predicts that subjects with higher guilt sensitivity should be found with less frequency in this
region than in other regions (i.e. on the line and in the region below the line).
Figure 3 shows that above the line, 59% of subjects have guilt sensitivity equal to or
greater than 1, while the corresponding statistic in the other regions is 42%. The
independency between them is rejected (p-value = 0.083). The mean guilt sensitivity of the
subjects above the line and in the other regions is 1.03 and 1.26, respectively. This is also
consistent with the prediction, while the difference is statistically marginal (p-value = 0.106).
Importantly, the finding that an individual’s belief significantly affects his/her choices cannot
be explained by the other preferences, such as pure altruism, which predict that only resource
allocation matters.
5.3. Results: Testable Hypothesis 3
While the results in Section 5.2 support guilt aversion, the elicited guilt sensitivity may
capture the other preferences, such as trustworthiness and pure altruism. Furthermore, unlike
the belief variable, guilt sensitivity could be correlated with other subject characteristics that
affect behaviour, such as wealth and demographics. Therefore, this section tests guilt aversion
using an econometric approach and controls for potential bias. Specifically, I elicit the
approximation for altruism and trustworthiness from the other games and estimate the
following model to isolate the effects of these preferences and other subject characteristics
from guilt sensitivity:
, (3)
where is the paired Player A’s first-order belief about xi, which is reported to subject i. gi
is the guilt sensitivity. Guilt aversion predicts and . Prefi includes the
approximation for pure altruism and trustworthiness. The procedure to elicit these preference
parameters is available from the author upon request. Table 3 shows that these variables are
indeed positively and significantly correlated. Hi includes subject characteristics as well as
the village fixed effects. While peer information is also included in the equation, this is
irrelevant in testing the preference.
Table 4 presents the result of Equation 3. It shows robust supporting evidence of guilt
aversion even after controlling for the other characteristics. The explanatory variables in
columns (1) and (5) include only two exogenous variables, and those in columns (2) and (6)
also include guilt sensitivity. An increase in belief increases the amount to take away, and an
increase in guilt sensitivity decreases the amount. I control for the subject characteristics and
other preferences in columns (3), (4), (7), and (8). The results are qualitatively the same.
Intriguingly, altruism and trustworthiness do not explain the pattern of experimental criminal
behaviour well, while the signs of the coefficients are consistent with the prediction.
Finally, three types of robustness checks are discussed in Appendix C: the change in
the form of the utility function, the credibility of informed beliefs in the trust game, and the
order effects. The results do not change qualitatively.
6. External Validity: Guilt Sensitivity to Predict the Victimisation
Experience
Using the survey data, this section examines the validity of guilt sensitivity in predicting
crime incidence in the real world. Guilt averse individuals are expected to be less likely to
commit crime. Yet, in practice, it is difficult to collect data on crimes committed by the
respondents, as they might not report their true crime experience(s).
Therefore, I examine the determinants of victimisation by following Barslund et al.
(2007) and Gaviria and Pagés (2002). I test the following hypothesis: individuals residing in
more guilt averse neighbourhoods are less likely to be victims of crime. Equation 4 is
estimated using the cross-section probit model:
, (4)
where takes unity if the household of subject i experienced crime victimisation between
May 2009 and December 2010 (when the survey was conducted) and zero otherwise.12
and indicate the mean level of and in the village, respectively.13 Guilt
aversion predicts that should be negative.
A potential concern while exploring the correlation between crime victimisation and
preference at the village level is the possibility of bias due to reverse causality and omitted
variables. Since the experiment was conducted after the household survey, any past
experiences of crime victimisation may have affected the preference of individuals. This, in
turn, would affect the mean preference at the village level. Therefore, I control for the
preference variables at the individual level ( and ) as well. These variables capture
the effect of past crime victimisation on individual preference, addressing the possibility of
reverse causality.14 In order to address the omitted variables, the explanatory variables
12 The study areas were attacked by Cyclone Aila in May 2009. Crime incidence had increased since then
in some areas.
13 While includes a set of household characteristics described above, it does not include individual
subject characteristics, because the survey respondents are not necessarily the same as the experiment
subjects, and the dependent variable is a household-level variable. This specification does not control for
the village fixed effects, given that I am interested in the village-level variables.
14 Yet, the exclusion of these individual preference variables does not affect the result qualitatively.
include various subject characteristics.
An important feature of crime victimisation is that the households with particular
characteristics (e.g. wealthy households) are more likely to be targeted than other households
(Gaviria and Pagés, 2002). This is also true for households with poor access to law
enforcement authority (Levitt, 2004), with few adult males (Barslund et al., 2007), with poor
social capital (Lederman et al., 2002), and in geographically isolated areas (Fafchamps and
Moser, 2003; Fafchamps and Minten, 2006). Therefore, such households might benefit from
high guilt sensitivity more than others. Thus, I examine the effect of guilt sensitivity at the
village level using the following subsamples: the wealthiest quartile in each village in terms
of total assets, households that have no communication with village leaders, households in
the village with the mean trustworthiness at the village level being lower than the sample
median, households with the proportion of males over 15 years of age being lower than the
sample median, and households located far away from markets.
Table 5 reports the estimation results. The odd-numbered and even-numbered
columns report the numbers for violence and property crime, respectively. The full sample
results in columns (1) and (2) show that while the coefficients of mean guilt sensitivity are
negative for both types of crime, they are statistically insignificant. However, intriguingly, the
subsample estimations show that households that are normally targeted are indeed less likely
to be victims of property crime in communities with higher guilt sensitivity. Moreover,
altruism and trustworthiness do not explain crime patterns in the real world, which is
consistent with the findings from the experiment; most coefficients of these variables are
insignificant, and while some of them are significant, they are counter-intuitively positive.
7. Conclusion
This study uncovered to what extent guilt reduces crime and the channels through which
social interaction influences the crime reduction effects of guilt. By conducting an artefactual
field experiment in Bangladesh, I found evidence of peer effect through changes in
second-order belief. This is also consistent with the broken windows theory. I also found that
individuals with higher guilt sensitivity and/or lower belief are less likely to commit crime,
consistent with the prediction of guilt aversion. Finally, individuals living in guilt averse
neighbourhoods are less likely to be victims of crime in the real world, supporting the theory
of guilt aversion.
A possible policy implication may be derived. The existence of peer effects implies
that communities benefit when law enforcement authorities monitor minor disorders.
Furthermore, peer effects caused by changes in beliefs indicate that those in crime-prone
communities are tempted to commit crime only when they believe that others anticipate high
risks of crime victimisation. Therefore, those who grow up in crime-prone cities would not
necessarily commit crime in other cities where residents anticipate lower risks. Consistently,
there is empirical evidence that teenagers who move from poor and crime-prone
neighbourhoods to more affluent ones are less likely to commit violent crime than those who
stay in poor neighbourhoods (Ludwig et al., 2001).
These findings must be interpreted with caution, however, since they hinge on the
validity of my identification strategy and the small sample dataset. Further studies using
different approaches and for varying contexts are required.
Appendix A: Sampling and Survey Data
This study uses household survey and experiment data collected in Satkhira district located in
southwest Bangladesh. This area has two distinctive properties. First, it was severely affected
by cyclone Aila in May 2009, and people experienced declines in income and loss of assets.
Second, it is prone to crime.
The household survey was conducted in December 2010. The questionnaire covers
data from January 2009 until December 2010 on the magnitude of cyclone damage,
evacuation behaviour, geographical characteristics, crime incidence, self-reported social
capital, demographic characteristics, labour and non-labour incomes, asset holdings, savings,
relief from the government and non-governmental organisations, membership of
microfinance institutions, food and nonfood consumption, and relationship with the other
sample households in the cluster. Table A1 presents the summary statistics on the used
variables.
I employed the multistage stratified random sampling methodology. In the first stage,
I selected the three sub-districts (Upazila) of Kaliganj, Ashashoni, and Samnagar, based on
their economic status, the intensity of cyclone damage, and crime incidences. In the second
stage, I randomly sampled two unions from each sub-district.15 In the next stage, four
villages from each union and one cluster from each of the villages were randomly selected.
Finally, 18 households from each cluster were chosen. Since 5 households were unavailable
for the survey, I obtained a total of 427 out of 432 sample households from 24 villages.
Appendix B: Robustness Checks for Section 4
B.1. The Informed Belief in the Take-away Game May Not Be Credible
The subjects might simply not trust the informed belief in the take-away game, if it is
unreasonably low or high. If this is the case, the response to the informed belief could be
non-linear. To address this issue, I replace the belief variable with a binary variable, which
takes unity if the belief is higher than 200 and zero otherwise. The result does not change
qualitatively. While the regression result is not reported here, it is available from the author
upon request.
15 ‘Union’ is an administrative unit in Bangladesh. Each union includes multiple villages.
B.2. Belief and Peer Information May Affect the Choice of Player B through Different
Channels
The subjects who are informed of higher belief and/or higher peer information may infer
that the other subjects are more self-interested. This reduces the subjects’ anticipated payoff
from participation in experiments, which, in turn, increases the amount to take away for two
reasons. First, they might attempt to assure a certain level of earning from the experiment.
Second, they might retaliate against such selfish subjects. These effects cause the
overestimation of the impact of peer information and belief.
However, first, these potential concerns cannot explain the difference in the
coefficient of peer information between the control and treatment groups, which is the main
finding of Table 1. Furthermore, if this is the case, those who are informed of higher belief
and/or provided peer information should behave in a less trustworthy manner in the following
trust game with hidden action. However, such evidence is not observed. Therefore, I consider
that these concerns are ignorable.
Appendix C: Robustness Checks for Section 5
C.1. The Utility Function (Equation 1) May Be Non-linear
One might be concerned regarding the linearity in the utility function. Therefore, I also
consider alternative guilt sensitivity computed under the following utility function: uB = x –
g max{x – τB, 0}2. The estimation results are presented in Table A3. They do not change
qualitatively.
C.2. The Informed Belief in the Trust Game May Not Be Credible
In the trust game with hidden action, I used the strategy method across seven levels of
first-order beliefs to infer guilt sensitivity. However, the anticipated payoff for Player A
when choosing In is lower than that when choosing Out, if his belief about Roll the die is
less than nine people (ρA < 0.5). Such a low belief might not be credible for Player B,
causing the elicited guilt sensitivity to be inaccurate. Therefore, I use the questions with
belief equal to or greater than nine people ([H-7] to [H-10]) and compute an alternative
sensitivity variable, which takes unity if the subject always rolls the die when the informed
belief is nine people or higher and zero otherwise. The estimation result is reported in Table
A4. Again, the result is robust.
C.3. Belief and Peer Information in the Take-away Game May Affect Guilt Sensitivity
The inferred guilt sensitivity might be attributed to the information participants received in
the previous experiments. Specifically, it might be influenced by peer information and
informed beliefs in the take-away game. To address this concern, I regress guilt sensitivity
on these variables. They are not significantly correlated to each other. The result is not
reported in the paper but is available from the author upon request.
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Fig. 1. Correlation between and x (Testable Hypothesis 1)
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Fig. 3. Correlation among First-order Belief, Guilt Sensitivity, and the Amount to Take Away (Testable
Hypothesis 2)
Table 1
Existence of the Peer Effect and the Channels (Testable Hypothesis 1 and Equation 2)
Dependent Variable x 1 if x > 200
Methodology Ordered Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient MEM MEM MEM
: Informed amount peers
take away ( )
0.0020* 0.0022** 0.0023* 0.0010*** 0.0012*** 0.0012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
: Informed amount peers
take away ( )
−0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0008 −0.0005 −0.0005 −0.0008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
: Treatment group
dummy
0.8904** 1.0122*** 0.9797** 0.3639** 0.4517*** 0.4110***
(0.418) (0.379) (0.408) (0.152) (0.147) (0.117)
The amount to take away
in the first session
0.0103*** 0.0045***
(0.002) (0.001)
1 if taking away more than
200 Tk in the first session
−1.5019*** −0.6422***
(0.386) (0.143)
Observations 208 208 208 208 208 208
Village fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Notes. ‘MEM’ stands for the marginal effect at the mean. The clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Table 2
Switching Point and Inferred Guilt Sensitivity (N = 279)
Range of belief to choose Range of guilt
sensitivity
Guilt sensitivity
in this study (g)
Proportion
(%)Roll the die Don’t roll
None 0~18
(0~100%)






























2.4 < g 2.4 5.7
0~18
(0~100%)









Notes. # indicates that these subjects switched their answers to the opposite or switched multiple times.
These observations are not used in the analysis.
Table 3







Notes. The correlation coefficients are reported. The p-values are in parentheses.
Table 4
Testing Guilt Aversion (Testable Hypothesis 3 and Equation 3)
Dependent Variable x 1 if x > 200
Methodology Ordered Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient MEM MEM MEM MEM
Informed first-order belief (τA,
τ
B)
0.0026*** 0.0027*** 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 0.0010*** 0.0011*** 0.0015*** 0.0015***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Informed amount peers take
away ( )
−0.0002 0.0002 −0.0006 −0.0006 −0.0005 −0.0004 −0.0006 −0.0006
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Guilt sensitivity (g) −0.2906*** −0.3166*** −0.2693** −0.1123** −0.0997* −0.0977*
(0.1095) (0.0876) (0.1354) (0.0567) (0.0539) (0.0556)
Altruism (Pref) −0.3165 −0.2307
(0.4925) (0.2159)
1 if trustworthy (Pref) −0.1249 −0.0050
(0.3765) (0.1840)
Large assets 0.4354*** 0.4115*** 0.5462*** 0.4983***
(0.1353) (0.1338) (0.1978) (0.1738)
Small assets −2.4720* −2.1300 −3.1670*** −3.0670***
(1.4744) (1.7722) (1.1157) (1.1237)
Age of head −0.0731** −0.0704* −0.0587 −0.0576
(0.0356) (0.0367) (0.0405) (0.0405)
Squared age of head 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Schooling years of head −0.0359 −0.0433 0.0031 −0.0014
(0.0510) (0.0530) (0.0224) (0.0233)
1 if head is married −0.6066*** −0.5984*** −0.1832 −0.1729
(0.2097) (0.2067) (0.1867) (0.1861)
Household size −0.0548 −0.0453 −0.0114 −0.0063
(0.1020) (0.1003) (0.0444) (0.0406)
Log(years since settlement) 0.1911 0.1831 0.0840 0.0827
(0.2173) (0.2207) (0.1055) (0.1028)
1 if Muslim −0.0859 −0.0810 0.1089 0.1100
(0.3542) (0.3579) (0.1921) (0.1958)
Duration of inundation 0.1600 0.1451 0.2111** 0.2065**
at working place (0.2006) (0.1994) (0.1027) (0.1025)
Height of inundation −0.1162 −0.1112 −0.1043** −0.1054**
at working place (0.0904) (0.0963) (0.0436) (0.0442)
1 if subject is household −0.3338 −0.3245 −0.1796 −0.1641
head (0.3042) (0.3034) (0.1370) (0.1409)
1 if subject is male −0.2714 −0.2733 −0.2191* −0.2279*
(0.2420) (0.2529) (0.1306) (0.1320)
Age of subject 0.0218 0.0222 0.0123*** 0.0120***
(0.0173) (0.0161) (0.0047) (0.0044)
Schooling years of subject 0.0315 0.0360 0.0216* 0.0235
(0.0236) (0.0252) (0.0129) (0.0146)
Observations 137 137 137 137 137 137 137 137
Village fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Notes. The subsample of the treatment group is used. The coefficients are reported. ‘MEM’ stands for the marginal effect at the mean. The clustered robust
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Table 5








% of males over 15
less than median
Distance to market over
1 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Violence Property Violence Property Violence Property Violence Property Violence Property Violence Property
Mean guilt sensitivity ( −0.156 −0.250 −0.110 −0.817** 0.149 −0.424* −0.285 −0.726** 0.157 −0.549** −0.729** −0.628*
(0.172) (0.191) (0.146) (0.380) (0.244) (0.244) (0.307) (0.354) (0.200) (0.261) (0.355) (0.330)
Mean altruism ( 0.419 0.394 0.095 1.099* 0.072 0.376 0.257 0.838 0.591 0.458 2.150*** 0.024
(0.321) (0.467) (0.140) (0.595) (0.575) (0.650) (0.678) (1.185) (0.447) (0.615) (0.533) (0.624)
Mean trustworthiness
(
−0.043 0.119 0.103 1.158* −0.571 −0.690 1.299*** 0.383 0.319 0.293 −1.034* 0.268
(0.322) (0.288) (0.158) (0.655) (0.417) (0.627) (0.480) (0.530) (0.386) (0.351) (0.611) (0.652)
Guilt sensitivity (g) 0.077* 0.039 0.002 −0.063 0.028 −0.061 0.111* 0.046 0.029 0.098 0.073 0.069
(0.042) (0.047) (0.006) (0.113) (0.082) (0.077) (0.059) (0.076) (0.072) (0.070) (0.059) (0.052)
Altruism (Pref) 0.038 0.126 −0.060 −0.054 0.382** 0.162 0.015 0.091 0.171 −0.017 0.026 0.165
(0.119) (0.123) (0.078) (0.264) (0.192) (0.202) (0.139) (0.200) (0.203) (0.178) (0.139) (0.168)
1 if trustworthy (Pref) −0.062 0.063 −0.003 0.087 0.183 0.204 −0.088 0.086 −0.060 −0.023 −0.024 −0.023
(0.062) (0.071) (0.011) (0.170) (0.122) (0.127) (0.112) (0.134) (0.078) (0.125) (0.109) (0.078)
Large assets −0.087 −0.081 −0.019 −0.137 0.842** 0.139 −0.076 0.062 0.377 −0.183 −0.079 −0.187
(0.073) (0.108) (0.026) (0.128) (0.399) (0.332) (0.094) (0.123) (0.412) (0.308) (0.089) (0.147)
Small assets −1.377** −0.002 −0.166 0.112 −1.943 2.839 −1.203 −1.237 −1.272 1.433 −2.992** −0.313
(0.685) (0.708) (0.272) (1.258) (1.906) (2.065) (1.276) (0.844) (2.081) (2.571) (1.235) (0.901)
Age of head −0.005 0.002 −0.003 0.074 −0.017 0.017 −0.006 −0.001 −0.030 0.011 −0.061** −0.009
(0.011) (0.012) (0.004) (0.054) (0.019) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.028) (0.041) (0.028) (0.030)
Squared age of head 0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.001** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Schooling years of head 0.007 0.021** −0.002 0.048** 0.002 0.003 −0.002 0.020 0.009 0.025 −0.004 0.020*
(0.006) (0.011) (0.002) (0.020) (0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020) (0.014) (0.011)
1 if head is married 0.013 −0.019 0.003 −0.134 −0.071 −0.239 −0.216** 0.171 0.200 0.043 0.130 0.128
(0.073) (0.114) (0.013) (0.238) (0.169) (0.163) (0.101) (0.188) (0.182) (0.199) (0.124) (0.188)
Household size −0.002 −0.032 −0.002 −0.073 −0.053* −0.055 −0.042 −0.043 0.026 −0.135** 0.037 −0.006
(0.017) (0.027) (0.003) (0.051) (0.027) (0.042) (0.041) (0.049) (0.043) (0.056) (0.031) (0.031)
Log (years since
settlement)
0.042 0.027 0.023 0.288** 0.162 −0.049 0.075 0.069 −0.003 −0.050 0.118*** 0.031
(0.046) (0.051) (0.026) (0.137) (0.103) (0.082) (0.079) (0.076) (0.088) (0.088) (0.043) (0.073)
1 if Muslim −0.086 0.024 0.003 0.048 0.184*** −0.012 −0.088 0.050 −0.010 0.244* 0.024 0.062
(0.071) (0.065) (0.005) (0.137) (0.061) (0.100) (0.132) (0.137) (0.144) (0.133) (0.096) (0.095)
Duration of inundation at
working place
0.041 −0.031 −0.010 −0.033 0.143*** 0.024 0.033 0.047 0.008 −0.082 0.055 −0.034
(0.032) (0.035) (0.016) (0.076) (0.051) (0.083) (0.054) (0.048) (0.049) (0.094) (0.039) (0.067)
Height of inundation at
working place
0.001 0.057*** 0.005 0.141** −0.017 0.055 −0.019 0.010 0.028 0.111* 0.031 0.054
(0.019) (0.021) (0.007) (0.066) (0.036) (0.039) (0.026) (0.023) (0.040) (0.067) (0.034) (0.047)
Observations 268 268 59 59 114 114 135 135 107 107 122 122
Village fixed effects No No No No No No No No No No No No
Notes. The marginal effects at the means are reported. The clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
Table A1
Summary Statistics on Survey Data
Variable Mean S.D.
1 if victimised by property crime after cyclone 0.46 0.50
1 if victimised by violent crime after cyclone 0.25 0.43
Large assets (106 Tk) 0.17 0.40
Small assets (106 Tk) 0.03 0.06
Age of head 44.92 13.05
Schooling years of head 4.77 3.97
1 if head is married 0.89 0.31
Household size 4.20 1.64
Log(years since settlement) 3.58 0.67
1 if Muslim 0.46 0.50
Duration of inundation at working place (months) 0.97 1.31
Height of inundation at working place (feet) 2.03 1.96
Observations 208
Table A2
Summary Statistics on Experiment Data and Subject Characteristics
Variable Observations Mean S.D.
Experiment data used in this study
The amount to take away in session 1 208 255.53 131.07
The amount to take away in session 2 (x)
Control group 71 180.28 133.22
Treatment group 137 229.56 90.66
Informed amount peers take away (xP)
Control group (xPC) 71 201.41 81.93
Treatment group (xPT) 137 197.08 82.20
Informed first-order belief (τA) 137 253.65 112.89
Guilt sensitivity (g) 207 1.29 0.80
Altruism (Pref) 208 0.42 0.29
Trustworthiness (Pref) 208 0.61 0.49
Subject characteristics
1 if subject is household head 208 0.51 0.50
1 if subject is male 208 0.68 0.47
Age of subject 208 35.44 13.89
Schooling years of subject 208 6.04 4.01
Table A3
Testing Guilt Aversion (Testable Hypothesis 3 and Equation 3) - Quadratic Moral Cost
Dependent Variable x 1 if x > 200
Methodology Ordered Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient MEM MEM MEM
Informed first-order
belief (τA, τB)
0.0027*** 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 0.0011*** 0.0015*** 0.0015***
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Informed amount peers
take away ( )
0.0002 −0.0006 −0.0006 −0.0004 −0.0006 −0.0007
(0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Guilt sensitivity under
quadratic moral cost (g)
−8.1363*** −8.9786*** −7.5178** −3.1114** −2.7127** −2.4211
(2.8371) (2.0503) (3.0915) (1.4689) (1.3546) (1.5312)
Altruism (Pref) −0.3128 −0.2331
(0.4949) (0.2217)
1 if trustworthy (Pref) −0.1548 −0.0271
(0.3517) (0.1792)
Large assets 0.4448*** 0.4186*** 0.5578*** 0.5024***
(0.1355) (0.1338) (0.2017) (0.1816)
Small assets −2.5354* −2.1594 −3.1709*** −3.0478***
(1.4283) (1.7451) (1.0988) (1.1327)
Age of head −0.0720** −0.0697* −0.0579 −0.0573
(0.0359) (0.0369) (0.0406) (0.0403)
Squared age of head 0.0007* 0.0007* 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Schooling years of head −0.0377 −0.0453 0.0024 −0.0025
(0.0505) (0.0529) (0.0220) (0.0234)
1 if head is married −0.5830*** −0.5801*** −0.1766 −0.1645
(0.2142) (0.2101) (0.1894) (0.1885)
Household size −0.0590 −0.0477 −0.0125 −0.0063
(0.1015) (0.0997) (0.0451) (0.0405)
Log(years since 0.1822 0.1770 0.0805 0.0801
settlement) (0.2160) (0.2166) (0.1062) (0.1015)
1 if Muslim −0.0944 −0.0905 0.1088 0.1093
(0.3583) (0.3608) (0.1924) (0.1946)
Duration of inundation 0.1625 0.1460 0.2111** 0.2057**
at working place (0.1977) (0.1979) (0.1011) (0.1022)
Height of inundation −0.1185 −0.1124 −0.1043** −0.1051**
at working place (0.0890) (0.0945) (0.0438) (0.0445)
1 if subject is household −0.3251 −0.3179 −0.1743 −0.1604
head (0.3095) (0.3074) (0.1384) (0.1412)
1 if subject is male −0.2710 −0.2757 −0.2181* −0.2276*
(0.2369) (0.2484) (0.1297) (0.1297)
Age of subject 0.0216 0.0222 0.0121** 0.0120***
(0.0177) (0.0164) (0.0048) (0.0043)
Schooling years of
subject
0.0323 0.0373 0.0216* 0.0241*
(0.0240) (0.0254) (0.0127) (0.0146)
Observations 137 137 137 137 137 137
Village fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Notes. The subsample of the treatment group is used. The coefficients are reported. The clustered robust
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Table A4
Testing Guilt Aversion (Testable Hypothesis 3 and Equation 3) - Binary Guilt Sensitivity
Dependent Variable x 1 if x > 200
Methodology Ordered Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient MEM MEM MEM
Informed first order belief
(τA, τB)
0.0027*** 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 0.0011*** 0.0015*** 0.0015***
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Informed amount peers take
away ( )
0.0002 −0.0006 −0.0007 −0.0004 −0.0006 −0.0007
(0.0009) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Binary guilt sensitivity (g) −0.4296** −0.5359*** −0.4345** −0.1547* −0.1648** −0.1451
(0.1781) (0.1294) (0.1691) (0.0918) (0.0791) (0.0889)
Altruism (Pref) −0.3237 −0.2431
(0.4983) (0.2279)
1 if trustworthy (Pref) −0.1930 −0.0383
(0.3329) (0.1728)
Large assets 0.4785*** 0.4436*** 0.5550*** 0.4993***
(0.1387) (0.1399) (0.1946) (0.1665)
Small assets −2.4823* −2.0713 −3.1573*** −3.0275***
(1.3945) (1.7319) (1.0775) (1.1253)
Age of head −0.0701** −0.0683* −0.0576 −0.0573
(0.0351) (0.0359) (0.0406) (0.0401)
Squared age of head 0.0007* 0.0006* 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Schooling years of head −0.0380 −0.0463 0.0023 −0.0028
(0.0502) (0.0527) (0.0218) (0.0237)
1 if head is married −0.5722** −0.5728*** −0.1714 −0.1592
(0.2250) (0.2178) (0.1910) (0.1892)
Household size −0.0629 −0.0491 −0.0134 −0.0063
(0.1016) (0.0996) (0.0457) (0.0406)
Log(years since settlement) 0.1712 0.1692 0.0786 0.0794
(0.2121) (0.2117) (0.1075) (0.1022)
1 if Muslim −0.0810 −0.0813 0.1136 0.1140
(0.3677) (0.3694) (0.1921) (0.1952)
Duration of inundation 0.1773 0.1560 0.2157** 0.2094**
at working place (0.1965) (0.1969) (0.1011) (0.1018)
Height of inundation −0.1211 −0.1134 −0.1047** −0.1058**
at working place (0.0882) (0.0940) (0.0433) (0.0441)
1 if subject is household
head
−0.3234 −0.3172 −0.1738 −0.1602
(0.3166) (0.3122) (0.1405) (0.1439)
1 if subject is male −0.2908 −0.2945 −0.2244* −0.2342*
(0.2350) (0.2435) (0.1243) (0.1230)
Age of subject 0.0226 0.0232 0.0124** 0.0123***
(0.0181) (0.0168) (0.0050) (0.0047)
Schooling years of subject 0.0347 0.0402 0.0220* 0.0248*
(0.0243) (0.0255) (0.0122) (0.0146)
Observations 137 137 137 137 137 137
Village fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Notes. The subsample of the treatment group is used. The coefficients are reported. The clustered robust
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
